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ABROAD IN THE LAND: LEGAL 
STRATEGIES TO EFFECTUATE THE 
RIGHTS OF THE PHYSICALLY DISABLED 
"Movement, we are told, is a law of animal life. As to man, 
in any event, nothing could be more essential to personality, 
social existence, economic opportunity-in short, to individual 
well-being and integrntion into the life of the connnunity-than 
the physical capacity, the public approval, and the legal right to 
to be abroad in the land." 1 
The past decade has witnessed a growing public awareness of the 
rights of many disadvantaged and previously ignored groups in society. 
Essentially unnoticed, however, are the problems of the physically 
di~abled.~ Discrimination against the handicapped exists in many forms. 
For instance, entire school systems flagrantly violate state law by ex- 
cluding handicapped children;" planners design public buildings which 
are inaccessible to the physically di~abled;~ and employers, fearful of 
higher insurance costs, refuse to hire them? While the ensuing economic 
costs are serious, the human costs, in terms of the suffering and wasted 
lives, are even more distressing. 
1 Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of 
Torts, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 841 (1966) (Professor tenBroek himself was blind). 
2The total number o£ physically handicapped individuals in the United States is not 
readily ascertainable. One authority recently placed the number at 11.7 million. See 
Hearings on H.R. 8395 Before the S u b c m .  on the Handicapped of the Senate C m .  
on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 265 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 
Handicapped Hearing.-Senate]. The difficulty in obtaining accurate and meaningful 
statistics is attributable to the inability of statisticians to measure the effect of a defined 
handicap on the capacity of the handicapped to function normally in society. For ex- 
,ample, the epileptic may not be handicapped in his capacity to use public transporta- 
tion; however, he is severely limited in his ability to secure and maintain employment. 
See M. Gandy, Notes on Employment Problems and Epilepsy Patients, Jan. 4, 1971 
(available from Epilepsy Foundation of America). Similarly, an individual with a 
spinal cord injury may be able to obtain employment but incapable of utilizing public 
transportation in order to seek and maintain employment. See Handicapped Hearings- 
Senate 1006. Numerical statistics must be evaluated in terms of the resultant effect of a 
specific disability on participation in normal activity. See generally U.S. S o m  
SECURITY ~ M I N . ,  DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY SURVEY OF THE 
DISABLED: 1966 (Rpt. No. 10, 1970); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, CHRONIC 
Comrno~s  AND L I M ~ ~ A ~ O N S  OF A m n  ANXI Mosn in  (National Health Survey Series 
10, No. 61, 1971); U.S. HEALTH SERVICES Qr MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH, 
EDUC., & WELFARE, US  OF SPECIAL Arrs, (National Health Survey Series 10, No. 78, 
Public Health Service Pub. No. (HSM) 73-1504). 
sSee 118 GNG. REC. 1258 (1972) (remarks of Representative Vanik). 
.4See Washiigton Post, Dec. 8, 1972, § D, at 3, col. 1. 
' 5 See M. Gandy, nrpsa note 2, at 8. 
[ 1501 1 
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While a number of laws have been enacted which affect the handi- 
cappedB it is only recently that the handicapped themselves vocally 
have asserted their right to equal treatment.7 Proposed amendments to 
Title VIs and Title VI19 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would have 
prohibited discrimination against the handicapped in federal programs 
and in private employment. Although there was strong support for 
these bills among the handicapped, no action was talcen. A similar 
provision to prohibit discrimination in federal programs was included 
in the Rehabilitation Act of 19721° which was passed by Congress but 
subsequently vetoed by the President.ll 
In view of this limited legislative action, the handicapped may be 
forced to resort to the courts in order to vindicate their rights. T o  do 
6Most of these laws do not secure the civil rights of the handicapped, but rather 
provide services and assistance. 29 U.S.C. §§ 31-42b (1970) (vocational rehabilitation 
for persons injured in industry); Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Con- 
struction Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2661-66, 2670-77c (1970). See generally 
US. DEP'T OF HEALTH) EDUC. & WELFARE, SUMMARY OB SELECI-ED LEGISLATION RELATINO 
TO THE HANDICAPPED (1971). However, three recently enacted federal laws protect some 
aspects of a handicapped person's civil rights. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-56 (1970) (pro- 
hibits architectural barriers in newly constructed and renovated federal buildings); Act 
of Oct. 21, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-515, 86 Stat. 970 (protects civil rights of the blind and 
the otherwise physically disabled in the District of Columbia; requires equal access to  
public places, public accommodations and conveyances; prohibits discrimination in em- 
ployment; and guarantees equal access to housing); Education Amendments of 1972, 
Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 903, 86 Stat. 235 (prohibits discrimination against the blind in 
federally funded educational programs). 
Several states have gone further than the federal government in securing the rights of 
the disabled. The Illinois constitution guarantees the physically and mentally handi- 
capped the fullest possible participation in the social and economic life of the state. 
ILL. CONST. art. I, 5 19. Other states have anti-discrimination laws protecting handi- 
capped persons seeking employment in private industry. See IOWA CODE ANN. 4 601A.7 
(Supp. 1972); WIS. STAT. § 111.31 (1969). In addition, many state constitutions provide 
for education as a basic right. See F. WEINTRAUB) A. ABESON AND D. BRADDOCK) STATE 
LAWS ON EDUCATION O F  HANDICAPPED CHILDREN; ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (1971). 
But see id. at 11-12, 17 (some state constitutions permit omission from mandatory at- 
tendance laws of children with certain handicaps); notes 14-16 infra and accompanying 
text. A number of state statutes provide that publicly funded buildings must be acces- 
sible to  handicapped persons, and some statutes include publicly used-privately owned 
buildings as well. See COMMITTEE ON BARRIER FREE DESIGN) THE PRESIDENT'S COIMMITIW 
ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED, A SURVEY OF STATE LEGISLATION m REMOYI. 
A R ~ C T U R A L  BARRIERS. ee also note 59 infra. 
TThoben, Disabled People March for Civil Rights, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUC. & 
WELFARE) ~ I L I T A T I O N  RECORD, Sep. & Oct., 1972, at 24. 
8 H.R. .12,154, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
9 H.R. 10,962,92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972). 
10 H.R. 8395,92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). 
1lWeekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Oct. 30, 1972. The same provi- 
sion was contained in a revised version of the Act passed by the 93d Congress. S. 7, 
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). It again was vetoed by the President. Weekly Compila- 
don of Presidential Documents, Apr. 2, 1973. An attempt to override this veto failed. 
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so, they must develop new legal strategies by using existing theories in 
previously unexplored ways. This Note will consider the development 
of such strategies in the areas of education, physical access and 
employment. 
Sixty percent of the estimated seven million handicapped children 
in the United States are denied the special educational assistance they 
need for full equality of opportunity.12 One million are excluded 
entirely from public school systems.13 The bases for this discrimination 
lie in constitutional provisions,14 statutes15 and court decisions16 of the 
various states. Two recent district court opinions, however, recog- 
nized the right of the handicapped to participate equally in public 
education. A consent decree issued in Pennsylvania Association Fm 
Retarded Chi ld~en v. P m n ~ y l v a n i 2 ~  required the state to provide free 
access to public education and training for all mentally retarded chil- 
dren.18 The court in Mills v. Board of EdacationlS stated that the 
education right extended to the physically handicapped as well as to 
the mentally retarded.20 The Mills court held that the denial of a pub- 
licly supported education for the handicapped in the District of Co- 
lumbia, where public education was available to all others, violated the 
due process clause of the fifth amendment.21 The same rationale may 
be applicable to the states through the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth 
12118 CONG. REC. S7852 (daily ed. May 16, 1972) (remarks of Senator Williams). 
18 Id. 
l4See DEL. CONS. art. 10, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. 12, § 5. Both the New Mexico and 
Delaware constitutions permit omission of the mentally and physically handicapped from 
the state's compulsory school attendance provisions. 
1sSee ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.010(b) (3) (1962); NEV. REV. STAT. 5 392.050 (1971). 
l6The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a board of education may deprive a 
physically handicapped child of his right to a public school education. See State ex rel. 
Beattee v. Board of Educ., 169 Wis. 231, 23435, 172 N.W. 153, 155 (1919). However, 
in 1967 the Wisconsin Attorney General, while reafkning the right of. local school 
authorities to exclude a student, stated that other means for a free, public education 
must be provided. See F. WEINTRAUB, A. ABFSON AND D. BRADDOCK, m p a  note 6, at 12. 
Thousands of handicapped children still are excluded from Wisconsin public schools. 
See 118 CONG. REC. E561 (1972) (remarks of Representative Vanik). 
17 334 F. Supp. 1257 (ED. Pa. 1971). 
18 Id. at 1259. 
19 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
20 Id. at 878. 
21 Id. at 875. 
=The fifth amendment, which contains a due process clause, is applicable to the 
District of Columbia, while the fourteenth amendment, which contains both a due 
process clause and equal protection clause, applies only to the states. See Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 US. 497,499 (1954). Though both concepts stem from the American ideal 
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The Supreme Court has applied avo tests for judging whether a 
state's justification defeats an equal protection challenge. Under the 
more lenient rational basis test, a state's classification is unconstitutional 
only if based on grounds totally irrelevant to the state's 0bjective.2~ 
However, when fundamental interests24 or suspect classificationszG are 
involved, the Court scrutinizes discriminatory laws more carefully 
and requires the state to demonstrate an interest sufficiently compelling 
to overcome a presumption of in~alidity.2~ 
Discrimination against the handicapped may be a suspect classifica- 
tion. The courts have found suspect classifications when the particular 
group involved is saddled with such disabilities, subjected to a history 
of such purposeful discrimination, or relegated to a position of such 
political weakness as to require special p r~ tec t ion .~~  The stigma of 
inferiority usually attached to such a classification has been the major 
determining factor in designating classifications as Handi- 
capped groups historically have been politically weak and fragmented?O 
of fairness, they are not mutually exclusive. While the equal protection clause is 3 
more explicit safeguard against prohibited unfairness than the due process clause, every 
interest found to be fundamental and protected under due process probably is funda- 
mental under the equal protection clause as well. See Developments in the Lm-Eqrutl 
Protection, 82 HARV. L REV. 1065, 1130 (1969). Thus the Mills court's rationale based 
on the due process clause in the District of Columbia is sound precedent for application 
of the equal protection clause t o  the states. 
23See, e.g, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 
463-64 (1957); Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911); see notes 
129-130 infrn and accompanying text. 
24Fundamental interests include travel, voting, criminal procedure, marriage and pro- 
creation. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (travel); Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) (voting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 
(1963) (criminal procedure); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 
541 (1942) (marriage and procreation). 
26 Suspect c1.assifications are those classifications based on alienage, race and national 
ancestry. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (race); Koremam v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 
(1944) (national ancestry). 
26See, e.g, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 US. 330, 339 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of 
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964). 
The presence of a fundamental interest or a suspect classification is sufficient to trigger 
the compelling state interest test. See, e.g, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 
(1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 
11 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
27 See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 U.S.L.W. 4407, 4415 
(US. Mar. 21,1973). 
ZsSee, e.g, Loving v. Virginia, 388 US. 1, 7 (1967) (racial classification); Brown v. 
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (racial classification); ICorematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 239 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (national ancestry classifica- 
tion). See generally Comment, T h e  Evolution of Eqml Protection-Edzrcntion, Mfmici- 
pal Services and Wealth, 7 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 103, 132-35 (1972). 
29 See Handicapped Hem*ngsSennte 564-67. 
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and handicapped persons have been stigmatized by society with a badge 
of inferiorieO The handicapped condition, often congenital and- un- 
alterable, has been analogized to racial cla~sifications~~ which almost 
always compel the strict standard of re~iew.3~ classification of the 
handicapped, involving a politically weak group with a congenital or 
unalterable trait, similarly should undergo the strictest scrutiny by the 
courts. 
The alternative method to invoke the application of the compelling 
state interest test is to recognize education as a fundamental intere~t.3~ 
The Supreme Court, however, in San Antonio Independent. School Dis- 
trict Y.-~odriguez;4 sustained Texas' use of the p r o p e q  tax as the 
means for financing public education, while holding that education 
is not a fundamental interest.35 The Court, nevertheless, left open a door 
to a constitutional attack on unequal educational opportunity when 
this inequality consists of an absolute denial of education.3c Such an 
absolute-denial of education is what confronts many handicapped chil- 
30Kriege1, Uncle Tom and Tiny Tim: Some RefIections on the Cripple as Negro, 
38 AMERICAN SCHOLAR 412 (1969). But see Developments in the Law, mpa note 22, at 
1127 (stigma of inferiority does not attach to  certain physical disabilities as it  does to 
recognized suspect classifications). 
31 Kriegel, ncpra note 30, at 416. 
8aThe Supreme Court struck down a racial classification involving segregation in the 
public schools. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Per curiarn decisions 
issued by the Court subsequent to Brown dealing with other public facilities such as 
parks, bathhouses and golf courses indicate that all racial classifications are viewed with 
strictest scrutiny. See, e.g, New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 
U.S. 54 (19581, a r g  ivzenz. 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.); Mayor & City Council v. Dawson, 350 
U.S. 877 (1955), afg menz. 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical 
Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), vacating 7izenz. 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953). Subsequent 
decisions have applied the same suict standard. See, e.g, Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 
U.S. 1 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 
184 (1964). 
33See, e.g, Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F; Supp. 280, 
283 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 41 U.SL.W. 4401 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1973); Van Dursatz v. 
Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 874-75 (D. ~Minn. 1971); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 
604-10, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 615-619 (1971). 
34 41 U.SL.W. 4401 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1973). 
35 Id. at 4417. 
30 Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financing system 
occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to  any of its 
children, that argument provides no basis for finding an interference with 
fundamental rights where only relative differences in spending levers are 
involved and where-as is true in the present 'case-no charge fairly could 
be made that the system fails to  provide each child with an opportunity to 
acquire the basic and minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the 
, 
rights of speech and of full participation in the political process. 
Id. at 4418. 
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~ l r e n . ~ ~  Hence the holding of Mills zr. Board of Eclzt~ation,8~ that the 
right to a free, publicly supported education extends to all handicapped 
children,s9 should not be placed in jeopardy by the Rodriguez decision. 
In situations where there is no absolute denial of education to the handi- 
capped, but merely the allegation that the education provided by the 
state is inadequate, the Rodriguez decision will l i t  plaintiff's attempts 
to obtain the strict scrutiny of suspect classification analysis. 
If successful in establishing the handicapped condition as a suspect 
classification, traditional arguments offered as justifications by the stare 
probably would not pass the compelling interest test. Whiie a state 
might argue that prohibitive costs compel such classification, the Su- 
preme Court has stated previously that constitutional rights cannot be 
denied merely because their protection will necessitate the expenditure 
of public f ~ n d s . 4 ~  Similarly administrative inconvenience is not a com- 
pelling interest justifying the exclusion of the physically disabledF1 
School systems which discriminate against or totally exclude handicapped 
children then would have to provide the equal educational opportuni- 
ties to which all children are entitled.& 
TRANSPORTATION 
The two major barriers to complete utilization of transportation 
facilities by the physically handicapped are architectural design and 
legal recognition of the rights of the handicapped. Architectural im- 
pediments are particularly acute for individuals confined to wheelchairs 
who are often unable to enter buses, trains, planes, or transportation 
ter1ninals.4~ Since these physical obstacles can be eliminated effectively 
by modern technology and proper ~lanning,4~ the only remaining 
barrier to sufficient mobility is the lack of legal principles implementing 
the right to fully use such fa~ilities.~~ Even where that right clearly is 
37 See notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text. 
38348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); see notes 19-22 m#ra and accompanying text. 
39 348 F. Supp. at 875. 
4oSee, e.g, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut, 
401 US. 371, 382 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1970). 
41 Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 US. 371, 381 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 
254,265-66 (1970). 
42See F. W E I ~ U B ,  A. ABESON AND D. BRADDOCK, supra note 6, at 40-46. 
43See Mandella & Schlveikert, Mobility for Physicnlly Ilmpaired Persons, 25 PARA- 
PLEGIA NEWS, NOV. 1972, at 14. 
44 Id. at 15-16. For example, California's Bay Area Rapid Transit System was designed 
to be totally accessible to disabled persons. Id. 
45Some attempts have been and are being made. The Civil Aeronautics Board has 
notified air carriers of its intention to exercise rule-making authority with regard t o  
the transportation of physically disabled persons. See 36 Fed. Reg. 20,309 (1971). The 
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established by legi~lation,4~ some officials have failed to initiate effective 
action.47 Thus, the courts again may be called upon to provide relief 
where legislation is either non-existent or not fully implemented by 
public officials. 
The Supreme Court has developed the principle that the right to 
interstate travel and the right to use the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce are fundamental under the Constituti~n.~~ In Shapiro v. 
Thomp~on,4~ the Court declared that statutes requiring residence as a 
prerequisite for the receipt of welfare benefits infringe upon the con- 
stitutional right to travel by inhibiting movement from one state to 
another.60 The Court reasoned that residency requirements create two 
move is in reaction to present dissatisfaction with a 1962 industry agreement. See CAB 
Agreement No. 16614 (Dec. 31, 1962). See generally Medical Criteria for Passenger 
Flying, AR-s OF ENVIRONME~AL HEALTH, Feb., 1961. The new rules have not been 
promulgated. 
The Interstate Commerce Commission has not regulated the transportation of handi- 
capped persons via rail or interstate bus. See H d c a p p e d  HearingsSenme 515. How- 
ever, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRACK) has provided bar- 
rier-free construction in new equipment and facilities and renovation of old equipment 
and facilities where practical and feasible. National Railroad Passenger Corp. Ekecutive 
Memorandum No. 72-4 (Mar. 15, 1972). 
40See 42 U.S.C. 5 4151 (1970) (requiring that buildings financed with federal funds be 
designed and constructed to be accessible to the physically handicapped). The statute 
was amended in 1970 to include the Washington, D.C., subway system, presently under 
construction. See Act of Mar. 5, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-205, 84 Stat. 49 mending 42 
U.S.C. 5 4151 (1970). 
47 Washington, D.C., subway officials refused to approve installation of elevators in 
the local system, as mandated by Congress, until ordered by the court to do so. See 
Washington Urban League, Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 
Inc., Civil No. 776-72 (D.D.C., June 29, 1973). The suit focused on the need for fur- 
ther appropriating legislation rather than individual rights. 
4BSee United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966). The right was first d c u -  
lated by Chief Justice Taney in the Passenger Cases, a series of cases concerning the 
right of the states to impose a tax on aliens. Passenger Cases, 48 US. (7 How.) 282, 
463 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting). Eighteen years later a majority of the Court 
adopted Taney's earlier views that the right to travel is an incident of national citizen- 
ship. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,49 (1867). 
49 394 US. 618 (1969). 
6oZd. at 629. Pennsylvania, Connecticut and the District of Columbia had statutory 
provisions denying welfare assistance to individuals who had not resided in the particu- 
lar jurisdiction for at least one year. Id. at 622-27. See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residency requirement as prerequisite for voting violative 
of fundamental right to travel calling for application of compelling state interest test). 
Whereas both Guest and Shapiro only involved the right to travel interstate, lower 
courts have found a fundamental right to travel intrastate. See King v. New Rochelle 
Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.), cm.  denied, 404 U.S. 863 
(1971); Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F2d 807, 809 (1st Cir. 1970); Valenciano v. 
Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600, 603 (D. Ariz. 1971). The Supreme Court has never ad- 
dressed the question of purely intrastate travel. The majority in Shapiro did not ascribe 
the right to travel to any particular constitutional provision but rather to the general 
constitutional concepts of personal liberty. 394 US. at 629. In dissent, Chief Justice 
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classes of potential welfare recipients-those living within the state for 
the prescribed period and those living within the state for less than 
the prescribed period;G1 Applying the compelling state interest test, the 
Court concluded that a classification which infringes the fundamental 
right to travel violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment."2 
Similarly, all travelers might be classified into two groups-the physi- 
cally handicapped, who have restricted access to the instrumentalities 
of interstate travel, and the non-handicapped, who have complete access. 
Since these discriminatory restrictions constitute an infringement on the 
right to travel, transportation companies should be required to demon- 
strate that a compelling state interest justifies the exclusion of the 
handicapped. Of course, some governmental action must be shown 
as a prerequisite for application of either the due process or the equal 
protection clauses.5g Publicly owned transportation companies, and 
even certain privately owned companiesp4 would satisfy the "state 
action" requirement. 
Warren and Justice Black looked to the commerce clause for the origins of the right. 
See id. at 644, 648 (Warren, C.J., Sr Black, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan, in dissent, 
concluded that the right has its source in the due process clause of the fifth amend- 
ment. Id. at 655, 671 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Court has also found a close rela- 
tionship between the freedom to travel and the fieedoms of speech and association. 
See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964). Under the view that the 
right to travel stems from the commerce clause, it probably would not apply to  purely 
intrastate transportation. But, if the right derives from the freedoms of speech and 
association, it would be di icult  t o  deny its application to  intrastate travel. See Note, 
Residence Requirements After Shapiro v. Thmpson ,  70 COLUM. L. REV. 134, 138 (1970). 
51 394 US. at 627. 
62 Id. at 638. The  Court further held that the District of Columbia's residence re- 
quirements for welfare benefits violated the due process clause of, the fifth amendment. 
Id. at  64142. See generally 1 C. A m m ~ u ,  MODERN C O N ~ T U ~ O N A L  L W § 8.94 (1969). 
The equal protection clause does not apply to the District of Columbia. See note 22 
supza. 
- 53For a court t o  find that a transportation system is in violation of equal protection, 
state action must be shown. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Governmental action is also 
necessary for application of fifth amendment due process. See Public Utilities Comm'n. 
v. Pollack, 343 US. 451,461 (1952); Corrigan v. Buckely, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926). The 
operation of a transportation company regulated under the authority of Congress con- 
stitutes governmental action. See Public Utilities Comm'n. v. Pollack, s z p  at 461-62. 
54A privately owned municipal transit system can be so enfranchised that i t  is state 
action for the company to engage in conduct violative of equal protection. See Boman 
v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960); Williams, The  Tw'light of 
State Action, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 347, 358-59 (1963). The courts have found state action 
in various other instances. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (private 
organization carrying out a public function); Burton v. Wilmington Parldng Authority, 
365 U.S. 715 (1961) (private business an integral part of a public building devoted to a 
public service); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of a 
private agreement). But see Moose Lodge 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (mere 
licensing does not constitute state action). 
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The cost of solving current architectural problems through existing 
technology should not be a sufficiently compelling interest to justify 
the denial of a fundamental constitutional right such as travelF5 There- 
fore, courts may be asked to require publicly owned and some privately 
owned transportation systems to spend the funds necessary to make 
their facilities accessible to the physically handicapped. 
PUBLIC BUILDINGS 
The handicapped presently are excluded from many public build- 
ings by architectural barriers ranging from monumental staircases to 
six-inch Although federal law requires that all new federal 
and federally assisted facilities designed for public use be readily acces- 
sible," there is no provision for existing structuresF8 State statutes 
addressing the problem of architectural barriers also generally ignore 
the need for modifications of existing buildings." These buildings 
house a wide range of federal and state agencies and services to which 
the public must have access; the efforts of the handicapped individual 
to secure assistance and present grievances and complaints are impeded 
by his inability to gain physical access to the buildings. 'If this inter- 
ference infringes the handicapped person's constitutional rights, re- 
moval of the interference may be forced by court action. 
GSSee, e.g, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut, 
401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255-56 (1970). 
5uSee Martin, A Wheelchair View, Washington Post, Dec. 8, 1972, 5  D, at 5, col. 1; 
Martin, W h e n  'Up' is n D o q  Washington Post, Oct. 29, 1972, 4  K, at  1, col. 1; Martin, 
Hmulicaps on the Hill, Washington Post, Oct. 1, 1972, 4  L, at 1, col. 8. 
57See 42 U.S.C. 4 5  4151-56 (1970). Primary responsibility for developing standards is 
lodged with the Administrator of General Services who must consult with the Secretary 
of Health, Education, and Welfare. Id. § 4152 (1970). Regulations passed pursuant t o  
the legislation have incorporated detailed accessibility standards adopted by the Ameri- 
can National Standards Institute. Federal Property Management Regulations, 41 C.F.R. 
§ 101-17.703 (1972) ; see AMERICAN ATIONAL STAAWARDS IN TITUTE, AMERICAN STANDARD 
SPECIFICATIONS FOR MAKING BUILDINGS AND FACIL~ES ACCESSTSLE TO AND USABLE BY THE 
PHY~ICALLY HANDICAPPED, USAS A117.1 (1961). The ANSI standards include ramp 
gradients, water fountain heights, and door and toilet stall widths. Id. 5  5. 
58 Only existing structures which are altered for federal use or with federal funds are 
included in the legislation. See 42 U.S.C. § 4151 (1970). 
50 See COMMIZTEE ON BARRIER FREE DESIGN, supra note 7. Some of the statutes provide 
that accessibility is required only if economically feasible and not unreasonably compli- 
cated. Others require that the building have one entrance which is accessible while 
ignoring other barriers. See id. Four states have laws covering publicly used, privately 
owned buildings; fourteen explicitly cover remodeling. See id. Like the federal gov- 
ernment, most states have no provision for existing structures. One county in Ohio did 
consent to erect an elevator in the existing county courthouse after suit by* a local 
resident. Consent Decree, Wargowsky v. Novak, Civil No. C-72-138 (N.D. Ohio, March 
30, 1973). Another county in Ohio consented to remove barriers from its court houses 
and the health and welfare building. Friedman v. County of Cuyahoga, Case No. 
895961 (Cuyahoga County Ct. 1972). 
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The Supreme Court long has recognized that citizens have the right 
to come to their "seats of government" to transact business and peti- 
tion for redress of  grievance^.^^ This freedom to petition is protected 
by the first amendmentm and applies to all branches of government, in- 
cluding the administrative agen~ies.0~ The judiciary has been vigilant to 
prohibit infringement upon the citizen's right to communicate freely 
with the government. In Brown v. L o ~ i s i a m ~  the Supreme Court up- 
held the right of the citizen to be physically present in a public build- 
ing to petition for redress of a grievance related to the operation of 
60The seat o i  government is where the courts, executive and legislature are located. 
Cf. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 US. 229,235 n.10 (1963). 
8lSee Gandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867); Passenger Cases, 48 US. 
(7 How.) 282, 491 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting). Although courts recognize the 
extreme importance of the right to petition, it has received much less attention than 
the rights of speech and assembly. Thii may be due to  the fact that it is closely inter- 
twined with the latter rights. See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 
U.S. 217, 222 (1967) (speech, assembly and petition intimately connected and equally 
fundamental). See also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (right to petition 
an integral part of republican form of government). 
62U.S. Co~sr. amend. I. The first amendment's prohibition of acts by Congress 
abridging the right to petition has been extended to the states through the fourteenth 
amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US. 296, 303 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 
US. 147, 160 (1939); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 656 (1925). Section 1983 of title 
42 of the United States Code prohibits state violations of, rights protected by the four- 
teenth amendment and can serve as a basis for suit against the state. See Wilwording 
v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) ; Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F2d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 1961) ; 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See also Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 
(1907) (right to sue and defend is privilege under article IV of the Constitution; right 
conservative of all other rights). 
63See California Motor Trans. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972), 
Although access to the courts is protected by the first amendment, when the state 
denies a party use of the courts or refuses a remedy, due process may be violated. While 
a state may regulate the manner in which its courts operate, due process is denied if its 
conditions are unreasonable. See Cohen v. Beneficial Finance, 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
See also Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (garnishment without 
opportunity to  defend). Such due process requirements extend to administrative actions 
as well. See Bell v. Burson, 402 US. 535 (1971) (license revocation by Bureau of Motor 
Vehicles); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (no evidentiary hearing prior to 
termination of welfare benefits). 
In a recent case the appellants argued that the imposition of filing fees on indigents 
in divorce actions violated their first amendment right to  petition. See Boddie v. Con- 
necticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). The Court, however, viewed access to the courts as an 
element of due process in this instance because the judicial process was the only means 
available for dissolving the marriage. Id. at 375. Why the Court chose due process is 
not clear since issues such as service of process would not have been necessary to 
resolve had they relied on the first amendment. See La France, Constitzrtionnl Lnw 
Refam for the Poor: Boddie v. Connecticut, 1971 DUKE L.J. 487, 529 (the author was 
counsel for appellants). 
84 383 US. 131 (1966). 
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that facility.c5 Moreover, in Edwards v. South CarolindB the Court 
viewed the defendants' efforts to enter the state house grounds, a public 
facility, to present their grievances as an exercise of first amendment 
rights in its most "pristine and classic form." 67 Thus, while public 
agencies have the right to regulate access to their fa~ilities:~ they may 
not do so in an unreasonable and discriminatory manner.69 Since the 
physical barriers which impede the handicapped individual's access gen- 
erally exist because of poor planning choices and serve no useful pur- 
pose, they may be attacked as unreasonable and discriminatory. The 
possibility of alternative means of communication is irrelevant. The 
defendants in Brown and Edwards had other means of communica- 
tion, but the Court nevertheless found the restrictions on defendants' 
access to be an unjustifiable burden on their first amendment rightsyo 
Since the right to petition is protected by the first amendment it may 
only be infringed when a danger exists to interests which the state 
lawfully may pr0tect.7~ The state clearly has infringed the rights of the 
handicapped since, although it did not create their physical condition, 
by constructing physical barriers it created their excl~sion.'~ The state 
had the alternative when building its facilities to use designs which 
would have made them fully accessible at similar costJ3 By an official 
65 Id. at 142. 
372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
07Id. at 235. 
6s See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131,143 (1966). 
69 Id. Discriminatory regulations infringing first amendment rights are prohibited even 
for restricted areas such as military bases. See Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 
(1972) (leaflemng permitted on "public street" within military base); cf. Downing v. 
Kunzig, 454 F2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972) (public normally has access when conducting own 
business). But see Barrett v. Kunzig, 331 F. Supp. 266 (1971), ufd,  41 U.S.L.W. 3128 
(6th Ci. Feb. 22,1972), cert. denied, 409 US. 914 (1972). 
70See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 US. 131 (1966) (statute idringed right to enter library 
to petition for end to segregated library system); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 US. 
229 (1963) (statute infringed right to enter state house grounds to express grievances). 
But see Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1%6) (state's interest in controlling jailyard 
p r o p e q  was sufficient to uphold convictions of demonstrators); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 559 (1965) (activities near court house may be limited in deference to judicial 
integrity). 
71See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (only compelling state interest can 
justify limiting first amendment freedoms). 
72Even if no first amendment right of access exists, the handicapped individual may 
be denied equal protection of the laws if the state creates an unreasonable classification 
between the disabled and the non-disabled without a rational relationship to some state 
interest. See note 23 m r a  and accompanying text. 
7sCost estimates by the National League oi  Cities based on seven hypothetical build- 
ings indicate that the additional cost involved in making them barrier free would be less 
than one-half of one percent. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ARCHI~C~URAL BARRIERS, 
DESIGN FOR ALL AMERICANS 7 (1967). Studies based on three buildings actually con- 
structed indicated that the cost was increased by only one-tenth of 'one percknt. See id. 
Heinonline 61 Geo. L. J. 1511 19721973 
choice of construction7Qhe state has infringed the rights of the handi- 
capped without countervailing state interest. Therefore the state has a 
duty to eliminate all such impediments to the free exercise by the handi- 
capped of their r i g h t ~ . ~ q o m e  changes, such as ramps and railings, may 
be effected at minimal financial outlay;76 others may involve expensive 
structural changes. The  courts, however, will order costly protections 
when Bill of Rights freedoms are i n~o lved?~  Thus, the handicapped 
individual may have a remedy against either the state or the federal 
government for violation of his first amendment rights. 
PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT 
Only a small percentage of the estimated 14 million physically 
handicapped Americans who could work if given the opportunity 
actually are empl0yed.7~ The  handicapped individual's unemployment 
74See United States v. ~ a i n & ,  362 u.s.-17, 25 (1960) (requirement of state action met 
when source is person or agency formally identifiable). 
75 Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ, 349 US. 294, 300 (1955) (remedies to constitutional 
infringement must be enforced). A court might find that the state's duty to provide 
access could be fulfilled by means other than barrier removal, such as providing agents 
to assist the handicapped individual in securing services he otherwise might be unable 
to obtain. While this may be an administratively logical solution, i t  does not seem to 
be fully within the meaning o i  the constitutional imperative that there be no infringe- 
ment. 
~ ~ N A ~ O N A L  COMMISSION ON ARCHITECTURAL BARRIERS, sIIpra note 73, at 3. 
77See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (abolished poll tax); 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel at trial); Douglas v. Cali- 
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel on appeal). See also Note, Discri?)zEnntions 
Against the Poor nnd the Fourteenth Amendnzent, 81 HARV. L REV. 435, 440-41 (1967) 
(financial interests of the state). 
78118 CONG. REc. 1472 (1972) (remarks of Senator Williams). One study showed 
that 25 percent of the unemployed handicapped respondents had tried but were unable 
to find jobs. See AD. Little Co, Employment, Transportation and the Handicapped, 
July 1968, at 30 (U.S. Social and Rehabitation Serv., Dept. of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, No. c-69492). 
Among the more severely handicapped, however, fully a third of those surveyed were 
unable t o  obtain employment. Id. at 31. The rate of employment for the entire sample 
was 50 percent, varying from a high of 75 percent for individuals with back and spine 
problems to a low of 29 percent for amputees. Id. at 29-30. 
In addition to private employment, sheltered workshops funded by the state voca- 
tional agencies provide training and work for some handicapped individuals. These 
workshops are partially exempt from the minimum wage requirements of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. See 29 U.S.C. S 214(d) (1970). Encouraged as a necessary al- 
ternative for the disabled, the workshops are criticized for providing inadequate wages 
and facilities. See Handicapped Henrings-Sennte 1016-47. See also H.R. REP. NO. 
92-1135, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1972). Additional jobs are provided under the Ran- 
dolph-Sheppard Act of 1936 which grants blind people licenses and initial financial 
aid for the operation of vending stands. 20 U.S.C. 1 107 (1970); see H.R. REP. NO. 
92-1135, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 49-55 (1972). These jobs may be limited by the increasing 
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naturally impairs his ability to support a family and to participate fully 
in the daily activities of society. Some, unable to rely on family 
support or other resources, are forced to accept welfare.7g 
Although transportation and physical barriers play significant role3 
in restricting employment possibilitie~,~~ a crucial factor is employer 
attitude. In addition to stereotyped prejudices,sl many employers fear 
that the handicapped person will be unable to perform assigned taskss2 
This attitude exists despite the results of numerous studies showing that 
the handicapped worker, when assigned an appropriate position, per- 
forms as well as, or better than, his non-handicapped co- worker^.^" 
In spite of reassurances by insurance associations, many employers 
also fear that workmen's compensation rates will increase due to em- 
ployment of the disabled.84 However, employment of the handicapped 
does not affect the premium rates either for non-occupational benefit 
plans or for workmen's compensati~n.~~ Furthermore, 46 states have 
second-injury laws which afford the employer some protection against 
bearing the full cost of support if a disabled employee is reinjured and 
permanently disabled.8G Nevertheless, employer prejudice against the 
handicapped as an insurance liability remains. 
use of automatic vending machines. Id. at 52. Encouragement to enterprises hiring the 
blind is also provided by the Wagner-O'Day Act which authorizes special purchases 
by federal agencies of blind-produced supplies. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 46-48 (Supp. 1971). 
70 It is estimated that rehabilitation by federally financed state vocational rehabilita- 
tion agencies of 51,084 handicapped persons saved over $40.5 million in public assistance 
payments. H.R. REP. NO. 92-1135,92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1972). 
sosee Handicapped Hearings-Sennte 515, 534-35; A.D. Little Co., supra note 78, 
at 30; notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text. 
81 One study showed that all d&abled-goups were subject to prejudice and that per- 
sonnel directors would prefer to hire a former prison inmate or mental hospital patient 
than an epileptic. See Richard, Triandis & Patterson, Indices of Employer Prejudice 
Towmd Disabled Applicants, 47 JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 52 (1963). See also 
M. Gandy, supra note 2. 
s2 See US. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. hTO. 234, WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION A D THE PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED WORRER 5, 20 (1961). 
. 83See id. at 6-8. 
84 The Association of Casualty and Surety Companies pointed out that rates are based 
solely on the relative hazards in the company's work and the company's accident experi- 
ence. Id. at 45. Statistics show that a company actually might minimize their accident 
experience by hiring the disabled since they have eight percent fewer accidents than 
their co-workers. See Handicapped Hearings-Senate 539. 
85 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 82, at 10. 
sosee Handicapped Hearings-Senate 535. Although many of these laws are limited 
in the types of injuries covered and the amount of liability, some states are attempting 
to strengthen the laws. Id. at 536. See also Hearings on H.R. 8395, H.R. 9847 and 
Related Bills Before the Select Subconnn. on Education of the Hmse C o r n .  on Edw 
cation and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Handicapped 
Hearings-House) ; US. EMPLOYMENT S ANDARDS A D M I N I ~ ~ O N ,  DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. 
No: 212 (1971). 
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Present governmental efforts promote voluntary action by employerss7 
and encourage placement activitieP but do not aid persons refused 
employment because of handicaps.89 Other groups, especially blacks, 
also face serious discrimination in hiring by private employers. Grad- 
ually barriers are being overcome and jobs are being opened to quali- 
fied persons without regard to race. Progress has been achieved by 
litigation based either on recentOO or on Civil War eraD1 legislation. 
There may be some hope for similar progress through the courts for 
the handicapped. 
The primary federal law prohibiting discrimination by private em- 
ployers, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:' clearly does not pro- 
scribe discrimination against the handicapped?" However, a 1968 Su- 
preme Court decision, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer e~.:~ involving racial 
discrimination, may provide a possible avenue of relief. The Court held 
that Section 1982 of title 42 of the United States Code,OG a relatively 
obscure statute originally derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866,0O 
applies to private racial discrimination in the sale of h0using.0~ In re- 
futing the general belief that state action was the Court 
87The President's Committee on Employment of the Handicapped works with indus- 
try to gain acceptance of the handicapped worker and sponsors a National Employ the 
Handicapped Week to publicize its efforts. See Handicapped Hearings-Senate 540, 
1036-37. Each state has a Governor's Council on Employment of the Handicapped which 
works closely with the President's Committee. In addition there are over 1,000 local 
committees. Id. at  539. 
8s In accordance with a 1971 Presidential directive, the vocational rehabilitation agen- 
cies, in conjunction with the United States Employment Service and the Veterans Ad- 
ministration, are placing special emphasis on training and job placement of Vietnam 
veterans. See Handicapped Hearings-Senate 25456. 
89 Only a few states have laws which prohibit private employment discrimination. 
See, e.g, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 13-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. 5 601A.7 
(Supp. 1972) ; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (Supp. 1973). 
90 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). 
glSee Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16,42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970); note 99 infm. 
Q2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). 
9gTide VII makes i t  an unlawful employment practice to discriminate against any 
person because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Id. 9 2000e-2 (a) (1970). 
Efforts have been made to expand i t  to include the handicapped without success. See 
notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text. Even if efforts t o  include the handicapped in 
Title VII are successful, no  Title VII remedy exists against employers of less than 25 
workers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (1970). 
94 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
95 42 U.S.C. 0 1982 (1970). 
96Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1,14 Stat. 27. 
97 392 U.S. at 420. 
9sSee id. at 409,419-20,436. Prior to Jones i t  generally had been assumed that section 
1982 required state action. See Larson, The Develo@mm of Section 1981 As R Rmredy 
for ~ a c i a l   scrimha hat ion, 7 HARV. CN. RIGHTS-CN. LIB. L. REV. 56, 57 (1972); 35 BROOK. 
L. REV. 275, 276-77 (1969). But see United States v. Morris, 125 F.2d 322 (ED. Arlt. 
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indicated that a companion statute, Section 1981,99 is applicable to 
private discrimination in empl0yment.1~~ 
The J o m s  Court examined the legislators' intent in enacting the 1866 
Act and the thirteenth amendment, the latter stating that "[nleither 
slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United 
States . . . ." lol An enabling clause grants Congress the power to 
enforce the amendment by appropriate legislati~n?~~ The Jones Court 
considered the amendment to have both a negative aspect-the abolition 
of slavery-and an implicit positive corollary-the establishment of uni- 
versal freedom?Or While specifically declining to decide whether the 
amendment itself did any more than establish universal freedom,lo4 the 
Court held that Congress, under the enabling clause, had the power to 
decide what acts constituted "badges and incidents of slavery" and 
1903) (section one of Civil Rights Act of 1866, predecessor of section 1982, prohibits 
private acts of discrimination aimed at preventing blacks from buying land). 
9DThe statute provides that "All persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to the 
fbll and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and prop- 
erty as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). 
Both sections 1981 and 1982 are derived from section one of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866. 392 US. at 422 11.28. The current United States Code notes that Section 1982 is 
derived from the 1866 Act but attributes section 1981 only to the 1870 statute which 
reenacted the 1866 Act after the fourteenth amendment was passed. However, section 
1981 retains the scope of the 1866 statute. See Note, Racial D i s c ~ h t i o n  In Employ- 
ment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 615, 619 (1969). 
looThe Court, in a lengthy footnote, specifically overruled an earlier decision which 
held that section 1981 required state action in employment discrimination. 392 U.S. at 
441 n.78, merrztling Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906). A lower court was 
prompt in seizing upon the language in J o m  to prohibit discrimination by private em- 
ployers on racial grounds. See Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (SD. 
Ohio 1968). T o  date five circuits have agreed. See Bradley v. Bristol-Myers, Inc., 459 
F2d 621 (8th Ci. 1972) (racial discrimination in hiring practices); Brown v. Gaston 
County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972) 
(racial discrimination in promotion policies); Young v. International Telephone & Tele- 
graph Co, 438 F2d 757 (3d Ci. 1971) (racial discrimination by both employer and 
union); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Ci. 1970), cert. denied, 401 
U.S. 948 (1971) (refusal to rehire based on race); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 
427 F.2d 476 (7th Ci.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970) (racial discrimination in hiring 
practices). 
One court has questioned whether section 1981 is in fact derived from the 1866 Act. 
See Cook v. Advertiser, 323 F. Supp. 1212 (MD. Ala. 1971), aff'd om other g r o d s ,  
458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972). The discrepancies on which the Cook court based its 
opinion may be due to the mistake of, a codiier in compiling and revising the statutes. 
See Note, Section 1981 and Private Discrimination, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1024, 1036- 
39 (1972). See generally Larson, supra note 98, at 56. 
101 US. CONS. amend. XIII; see 392 U.S. at 42244. 
lo2See US. CONS. amend. XIII, S 2. 
103392 U.S. at 439; see Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911); Hodges v. United 
States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
104 392 U.S. at 439. 
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thus could be prohibited.lo5 Although the Court indicated that Jones 
is applicable only to race,lo6 some commentators suggest that the ration- 
ale of Jones applies to other forms of discri~nination?~~ Thus, it is pos- 
sible to construct an argument asserting that the thirteenth amendment 
and the subsequent Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibit employment dis-l 
crirnination against the handicapped. 
In passing the thirteenth amendment the primary consideration hi 
the minds of the legislators was Negro slavery in the South?08 HOW- 
ever, in drafting the amendment the legislators recognized that it would 
make fundamental changes in the federal system and would enable 
Congress to establish laws insuring equality for all citizens?OD By enact-; 
ing section one of the 1866 Act, Congress extended to "citizens of 
every race and color" the same rights to purchase and contract as those 
enjoyed by "white persons." 11° Section 1981, derived from section 
one, is even broader-encompassing not only citizens but "all persons" 
within the United States.ll1 The  debates at the time of enactment in- 
dicate that the legislators did not intend to limit the protection of the 
Act to blacks.l12 Both sides in the controversy stated that the Act 
applied to all persons?13 The  legislators intended to prevent any group 
from being held in an inferior status by ensuring that only one level 
of citizenship existed throughout the land. 
105 Id. By passing the 1866 Act, Congress indicated that it considered discrimination 
in both the rights to purchase and the right to contract a "badge" or 'Tncident". Id. at 
441. In an early decision the Court refused to  regard private denial of public accommo- 
dations as a "badge or incident of slavery" under the thirteenth amendment since i t  
had nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 
3, 24 (1883). I t  viewed badges and incidents as those burdens and disabilities on funda- 
mental rights, such as the right t o  contract and to  purchase property, imposed by 
slavery. Id. at 22. Both employment discrimination and the housing discrimination pro- 
hibited in Jones fall within the earlier Court's definition. 
106 392 U.S. at 413. 
lo7See Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendnzent and the Federal Anti- 
Discriini~mtion Laws, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1019, 1026-27 (1969); 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
448,457-59 (1969). 
108 The thirteenth amendment was one of a series of post-Civil War enactments 
aimed at  terminating the last signs of slavery and ensuring freedom. It was preceded by 
the wartime Emancipation Proclamation and passed to insure that document's post-war 
validity. See 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGITS 13 (B. Schwartz 
ed. 1970). 
109 See J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 157-73 (1965). 
110 Act of April 9,1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. 
111 See 42 U.S.C. 5 1981 (1970) ; note 99 srcpra. 
ll2See J. TENBROEK, supra note 109, at 179; CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 438 
(1866). 
ll3See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 327 (1941); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess. 599,601 (1866). 
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Due to its language and its history, section 1981 has been applied 
to prohibit both racia1114 and non-raciaP15 discrimination. If the intent 
of the framers was indeed to secure universal freedom and to establish 
equality, then "white citizens," must be interpreted broadly. This 
standard was selected at a time when, compared with other groups, 
whites did enjoy superior rights and was intended to indicate the high- 
est form of personal liberty and freedom. The purpose and intent of 
the framers of the statutory provision, therefore, requires that the law 
not be limited to racial discrimination or to n ~ n - w h i t e s . ~ ~ ~  
114Cenaal Presbyterian Church v. Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894 (ED. 
Mo. 1969); Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp. 1240 (ED. Mo. 1969), modified on other 
grolmds, 450 F l d  127 (8th Cir. 1971). The courts in Central Presbyterian C k c h  and 
G m o n  held, in effect, that when blacks invaded a white church, whites were denied 
the rights of "white citizens." Comra Perkings v. Banster, 190 F. Supp. 98, a f d ,  285 
F l d  426 (4th Cir. 1960) (section 1981 jurisdiction not available to white claiming false 
arrest). See also Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 199 n.24 (7th Cir. 1972) (court 
suggests without deciding that section 1981 may not apply to white w h  was denied 
office rental because associates were blacks); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th 
Cu. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (section 1981 prohibits employment dis- 
crimination based on race, whether it is against blacks or whites; court however viewed 
ISCUS- section 1981 as based on fourteenth amendment); 23 VAND. L. REV. 413 (1970) ( d  
sion, of ~ m m a n ) .  . . 
11Qee Scher v. Board of Educ., 424 ~ 2 d  741,743 (3d Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (sections 
1981 and 1983 do not apply exclusively to racial or religious discrimination; available to 
boy denied equal protection by arbitrary expulsion from school). Conha Schetter v. 
Heim, 300 F. Supp. 1070, 1073 (ED. Wisc. 1969). But cf. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 US. 
780,791-92 (1966) (legislative history of Civil Rights Act of 1866 shows intent r d c t e d  
to racial equality). 
The Court also has upheld anti-peonage statutes based on the thirteenth amendment 
regardless of the race of the defendant. See Clyatt'v. United States; 197 US. 207, 218 
(1905). Section 1981 was enacted to enforce the thirteenth amendment and applies to all 
races and colors. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 US. 60, 78 (1917). However, the Court in 
BIlchanan appeared to place some weight on the reenactment of section 1981's -prede- 
cessor, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, afser the fourteenth amendment became effective. 
Id. at 74-76. Two other cases which hold that section 1981 applies to all races and 
colors appear to rely at least in part on the fourteenth amendment rationale. See 
Takahashi v. Fish Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (section 1981 rests in part on the 
fourteenth amendment); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 695-96 (1898) 
(acknowledges section 1981's thirteenth amendment basis but uses fourteenth amend- 
ment rationale). However, in a recent case involving denial of welfare benefits to resi- 
dent aliens the Supreme Court indicated that section 1981 was .separate from. the 
fourteenth amendment. See Graham v.. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state statute 
violated fourteenth amendment as well as federal power to regulate aliens as carried 
out by section 1981). Moreover, the Jones Court stated that reenactment of the 1866 Act 
after the fourteenth amendment did not affect the scope of the Act. See Jones V. 
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968). 
lleIt has been suggested that limiting the protection of the Act to blacks offends 
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, Note, The "New" Thir- 
teenth A71zend'11zem: A Prelinzinnry Analysis, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1294, 1315-16 (1969); 20 
. . CASE W. RES. L. REV. 448,459 n.75 (1969). ' 
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The Jones Court, while calling segregated housing patterns a "relic" 
of slavery,l17 applied the term to practices which could be traced only 
indirectly to the institution of slavery itself.l18 Thus the expression 
should not be used to limit a "badge or incident" to those employment 
practices which existed during the period of slavery. If by "relic" the 
Court meant the discrimination which the black man faces, not because 
of his former servitude, but because of his current second-class status 
'in society,l19 then that same discrimination is suffered by the handi- 
capped who are isolated and set apart from the mainstream of society.lZ0 
It cannot be said that the handicapped are treated as first class citizens 
enjoying all of the rights of "white persons." The handicapped, there- 
fore, should be protected by both the thirteenth amendment and section 
1981.- 
Such a view of the amendment and its purpose is consistent with the 
intention of its 'framers to secure universal freedom.121 Even if the 
,framers comprehended no other discrimination than racial, the Consti- 
tution is not an inflexible document, frozen by the attitudes and con- 
'ditions which prevailed at the time of its passage.122 Rather, the Con- 
. stitution is a living institution, adaptable to the circumstances of modern 
society and responsive to the ideal of true equality for all people. Since 
the courts must determine the significance of constitutional principles 
by considering their growth as well as their origin,128 their interpre- 
tation of the Constitution can be responsive to the changing social and 
economic values of the nation.124 The evil which the thirteenth 
- 
117 392 U.S. at 442-43. 
118 The Court viewed racial ghettoes which are a development of the 20th century as 
a "relic" of slavery. Id. But see Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, B m e d  and Confused 
Mzse, 1968 S. CT. REV. 89 (description of housing segregation during Civil War). 
11gWhile some of the discriminatory racial practices existing today may have been 
- in  existence at the time of slavery they appear to be based less on former servitude and 
more on unreasoning prejudice which causes some whites to view blacks as inferior. 
See 392 U.S. at 446 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
l2oSee Lassen, Voice of the Militant Cripple, EVENT (Aug. 1969) (published by the 
President's Committee on Employment of the Handicapped). The isolation may stem 
in large part from discrimination by employers and school systems. See notes 12-16, 
78-86 supra and accompanying text. 
121 See note 103 supra and accompanying text. 
122See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941); Wright v. United States, 
302 U.S. 583, 607 (1938). The Constitution is a starting point for developing legal 
reasoning rather than an aggregate of hard and fast precepts to be handed on and fol- 
lowed from generation to generation. See Stone, The Cumwon Lnw in the United 
Sfutes, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4,23 (1936). 
l23See Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (Holmes, J.). 
124See Note, supra note 116, at 1302-03. The lawmakers couched the amendment in 
terms general enough to encompass the total institution of slavery as it developed, 
responding fully to the evil perceived. Id. at 1302. As modern perception of that evil 
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amendment originally sought to eradicate was the inherent injustice of 
maintaining a class of people in a position of inferiority. An interpre- 
tation of the amendment which includes all persons who suffer from 
such inferiority, even if not the specific intent of the framers, would 
be within the spirit of their enactment?25 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
While federal agencies are prohibited by law from discriminating 
against an individual because of a physical few states have 
similar statutes. Moreover, the courts have given scant attention to 
whether a state agency is prohibited from refusing to hire an otherwise 
qualified person purely on the basis of a physical handicap,.127 The 
Supreme. Court consistently has recognized that the fourteenth amend-, 
ment, while granting the states power to treat classes of people in dif-' 
ferent ways,12* does deny them the power to discriminate on the basis 
of irrelevant criteria.129 Thus the Court, although never acknowledging 
grows, the response may assume an increasingly broader scope. Id. By rejecting an 
overly narrow interpretation of the amendment it may be more readily adapted to the 
"evils" of today's society. Id. at 1302-13. ' 
125See G& v. ~reckenr id~e,  403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971) (accords early civil rights 
statutes a sweep as broad as their language). However, Griffin indicated that the thir- 
teenth amendment is closely related to slavery. See id. at 105. In another decision the 
Couq dismissed an argument that a city's action to  close its pools rather than to inte- 
grate them was a badge or incident of, slavery. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 
(1971). The Court noted that although the enabling clause of the amendment might 
allow the passage of legislation to  control pool closings, Congress had. not chosen to  pass 
such a statute. Id. at 227. 
126See 5 U.S.C. 5 7153 (1970). Only one action has been brought under this statute. 
See Kletzing v. Young, 210 F2d 729 (D.C. Ci. 1954) (suit by blind man to  be r e h t e d  
on Civil Service employment register; brought under section 7153's predecessor; dis- 
missed as moot since register had expired). 
The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of. 1972 contained a section prohibiting discrimi- 
nation in federally funded programs. See H.R. 8395, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 5 601 (1972). 
The Act was vetoed by the President. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 
Oct. 30, 1972. 
127See King-Smith v. Aaron, 455 F2d 378 (3d Cir. 1972), redg 317 F. Supp. 164 
(W.D. Pa. 1970). The Third Circuit, in reversing the abstention-dismissal by the dis- 
trict court, remanded the plaintiffs fourteenth amendment and section 1983 claims and 
asserted that these claims enjoyed jurisdiction which the federal court had a duty t o  
consider. Id. at 381; see 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1970). 
128 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1970), citing Reed v. Reed, 404 
U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); 
Barbier v. Connally, 113 U.S. 27 (1885). 
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-55 (1972) (statute barring sale of 
contraceptives distinguished between married and unmarried individuals); Reed v. 
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (statute gave preference to  men in granting letters of 
estate administration); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457. 465-66 (1957) (licensing statute 
exempted one corporation); Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School Dist., 
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the existence of a right to public employment,130 has held that a person 
constitutionally is protected by the fourteenth amendment from arbi- 
trary employment discrimination by the state.131 
If a handicapped individual alleges facts which indicate arbitrary 
employment discrimination, action may be maintained under section 
1983 of title 42 of the United States Code.132 Since the action of an 
agency through its officials is state action within the meaning of the 
statute, the claim is c0gnizab1e.l~~ The complainant of course must 
be prepared to prove that the denial of employment was due to dis- 
crimination and not to a lack of proper qualifications. 
325 F. Supp. 560, 569 (N.D. Miss. 1971), modified, 461 F2d 276 (5th Ci. 1972) (racial 
discrimination in hiring and retaining public school teachers); accord, Chambers v. Hen- 
dersonville City Bd. of Educ, 364 F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 1%6) (en banc). See also 
note 23 m p a  and accompanying text. 
130For many years government employment and government services have been 
regarded as privileges, not rights, and thus unprotected by rules of, substantive due 
process. However, such distinctions have been so eroded that the concept remains of 
doubtful validity. See generally Alstyne, The Demise o f  the Right-Privilege Distinctim 
&z conr t i tu t io~l  Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). 
131See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967); Wieman v. Upde- 
gmE, 344 US. 183, 191-92 (1952). An individual is also constitutionally protected from 
einployment discrimination by the, federal government. See Colorado Anti-Discrimina- 
tion Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 372 US. 714, 721 (1963) (racially discrirnina- 
tory federal W i g  regulation would violate the fifth amendment); United Pub. Work- 
ers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947) (Congress could not enact regulation providing 
that no Republican, Jew or Negro could be appointed to federal office). See also 
Comment, Aliens and the Civil Service: A Closed Door?, 61 GEO. L.J. 207, 215-18 (1972) 
(federal discrimination and the fifth amendment). 
Even if a handicapped individual has a valid claim, he faces, however, the general 
reluctance of the coum to oversee federal agencies' hiring practices. See Comment, 
Racial Discrimination in the Federal Civil Service, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 265, 280 
(1969); Comment, Aliens and the Civil Service: A Closed Door?, 61 GEO. L.J. 207, 
216-17 (1972). 
13242 US.C. 5 1983 (1970). Section 1983 requires two elements: the party must have 
been deprived of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States; and 
the deprivation must have been under the color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. ICress & 
CO., 398 US. 144 (1970). . 
Section 1983 was originally section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 which was 
enacted to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. Mitchum v. Foster, 
407 US. 225, 238 (1972); see Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 5 1, 17 Stat. 13, as m)zended, 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Section one was modeled on section nvo oE the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866. 407 U.S. at 238; see Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 5 2, 14 Stat. 27. 
133The legislative debates surrounding passage of section 1983's predecessor indicate 
that the discriminatory state action may be executive, legislative or judicial. Mitchum 
v: Foster, 407 U?S. 225, 238 (1972); Ex pmte Virginia, 100 US. 339, 346-47 (1879). Even 
an abuse of authority is coyered by section 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 
172 (1961); United States v. Classic, 313 US. 325, 326 (1941). 
~bwever ,  the federal government and the District of Columbia are not states within 
the meaning of the statute. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 419 (1973). 
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If an action ismaintainable under either section 1983 or the fourteenth 
amendment the handicapped person may have recourse against 
a number of employers, depending upon their relationship with the 
state. Under a broad interpretation an action should be maintainable 
against all public agencies as well as private organizations sipdicantly 
controlled by the state.135 The handicapped individual must select the 
defendant carefully since municipalities may be immune from suit 
under section 1983.136 However, recovery has been allow.ed against 
134An action for denial of equal protection of the laws may be maintained under the 
fourteenth amendment alone. See, e.g, Grifiin v. County School Bd, 377 U.S. 218, 
232-33 (1964); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Staub v. 
City of Baxley, 355 US. 313 (1958). One court has held that an action not cognizable 
under section 1983 against a c k t y  could be maintained against the same defendant 
under the fourteenth amendment. See Shelbourne Inc. v. New Castle County, 293 F. 
Supp. 237, 245-46 (D. Del. 1968). C m a ,  Whimer v. Davis, 410 F2d 24 (9th Cir. 1969). 
The requirements for state action are the same under section 1983 and the fourteenth 
amendment. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966). 
Discrimination in transportation systems has been successfully labelled state action. 
See Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); 
note 54 supra and accompanying text. 
Actions of hospitals, too, have come under judicial scrutiny. See McCabe v. Nassau 
County Medical Center, 453 F.2d 698 (2d Ci. 1971). In McCabe the court held that 
since the hospital was a public institution, the plaintiff need not point to specific state 
statutes compelling them to act as they did in order to meet the "under color of state 
law" requirement of section 1983. Id. at 703-04. It is the source of the defendant's 
authority, not only the laws that purport to justify the action, which determine whether 
the defendant has acted under color of law. Id. at 704. Whether or not the state's role 
in regulating private hospitals would be sufficient to make their actions "state action" 
has been considered by several lower courts. The majority seem to have concluded 
that due to the states' role in disbursement of funds under the Hill-Burton Act private 
discrimination is state action. See S i n s  v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F2d 
959- (4th Cir. 1963) lexcellent discussion of Hill-Burton; racial discrimination); Holmes 
v. Silver Cross Hosp, 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. 111. 1972) (violation of religious belief); 
Sams v. Ohio Valley General Hosp. Ass'n, 257 F. Supp. 369 (N.D.W. Va. 1966) (&- 
crimination against out-of-state physicians); Hill-Burton Act § 622(f), 42 U.S.C. § 
211 (e) (f) (1970). But see Place v. Shepherd, 446 F.2d 1239 (6th Ci. 1971) (receipt of 
state or federal funds did not transform private hospitals into public institutions). The 
couk in Place indicated, however, that there might be a 'cause of action if a public 
hospital refused to hire. Id. at 1246. 
1SBSee Monroe v. Pape, 365 US. 167, 191 n.50 (1961) (Chicago not "p'erson" under 
statute). The decision has caused considerable confusion in the circuits, and some c o r n  
either have interpreted the Court's statements narrowly or have considered Momoe 
overruled sub silentio by later opinions which failed to consider whether the entity sued 
was proper under section 1983. Other courts have distinguished between actions for 
damages, such as Monroe, and those for equitable relief, or have ignored Momoe 
completely. See Johnson v. Cincinnati, 450 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1971) (ignored Monroe); 
Harkless v. Sweeney Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Ci. 1970), cert. de- 
nied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971) (restricted Monroe to its facts and granted equitable relief 
under section 1983); Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (7th Ci. 1969) 
(Monroe limited to money damages) ; Local 858, Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. School Dist. 
No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069,1073 (D. Colo. 1970) (Monroe rendered irrelevant by Supreme 
Court cases ignoring it); Note, Civil R i ~ h t s S c h o o l  Oficials' Not Persons For Purposes 
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entities such as school boards137 and state universities.la8 Even if an 
immunity exists, the plaintiff may sue the state employee who deprived 
him of his rights in the employee's individual capacity.laD Thus, the 
handicapped may have a potent means of redress for public employment 
discrimination. 
Although concern for the plight of the handicapped may be increas- 
ing, they still face serious obstacles in their effort to achieve equal 
treatment by society. While many areas merit attention, education, phy- 
sical access, and employment are among the most significant. Although 
there has been little litigation involving the rights of the disabled, pos- 
sibilities for redress do exist. By carefully selecting strong cases in 
which the right denied is extremely important, and the discrimination 
and damage are evident, the handicapped may be able to achieve some 
success through the courts. However, the theories discussed herein are 
only suggestions for legal action; they are largely unexplored and do 
not preclude the development of other strategies. 
It is nonetheless imperative for the handicapped to continue to focus 
efforts on Congress and the state legislatures. Legislation ensuring the 
rights of the handicapped would be the most uniform and far reaching 
solution to the problems presented. The inclusion of the handicapped 
among those protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1964140 is the most 
desirable solution on the federal level. Such an amendment would allow 
the handicapped access to the Act's complaint mechanisms and to the 
o f  Sectim 1983 Regardless of Relief Sought, 24 S.WL.J. 360, 362-64 (1970) (discussion 
of cases in which the appropriateness of the entity sued was ignored). 
Moreover, one court held that whiie a police department was not a person for pur- 
poses of section 1983, a suit for denial of equal protection could be maintained under 
section 1981. See United States ex rel. Washington v. Chester County Police Dep't, 294 
F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Pa. 1969), a f d  an rehearing, 300 F. Supp. 1279 (ED. Pa. 1970). 
See generally Thornberry, Suing Public Entities Under the Federal Civil Rights Act: 
Monroe v. Pape Rec-dered, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 108-17 (1971) ; Note, Developing 
Govenmzentnl Liability Under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1201 (1971); 24 
VAND. L. REV. 1252 (1971). 
137 See, e.g, Walton v. Nashville Special School Dist., 401 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1968); 
Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ, 391 F.2d 77 (6th Ck. 1968); Wall v. Stanley County 
Bd. of Educ, 378 F.2d 275 (4th Ck. 1967). 
138See Brown v. Strickler, 422 F2d 1000 (6th Cir. 1970) (no discussion of M m o e ) .  
Contra, &tun v. Rector, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970) (relies on M m o e ) .  
139See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 187, 192 (1961). Suits against the individual, how- 
ever, may have a limited effect on the public agencies' policies and mav produce little 
in the way 05 monetary recovery. See Note, Developing G o v m e n t a l  Liability Under 
42 U.S.C. 5 1983, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1201, 1209 (1971) (discussing recovery against 
policemen). 
140 42 U.S.C. f 2OOOe (1970). 
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expertise of its enforcement offices. The  enactment of legislation will 
not, however, be the end of the struggle. Rather, it will be the begin- 
ning of a process which eventually must ensure that every handicapped 
individual has an even start with the rest of society. 
Heinonline 61 Geo. L. J. 1523 19721973 
